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EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN: THE NEED FOR A
NATIONAL POLICY
In 1971, the theoretical proposition that women should enjoy equal
rights and opportunities has been accepted. There is evidence of this
acceptance from past legislation, resulting from social pressure in the
1960's, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the Equal
Pay Act,1 the equal opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, two executive orders' relating to discrimination in federal
contracts and federal employment, and numerous state fair employment
practices laws.' Unanswered, however, is whether the above state and
federal response is sufficient to in fact enable women to enjoy equal
rights and opportunities, or whether the proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment, in any of its suggested forms, is also needed to resolve the dis-
parity between theory and reality.
The problems of equal rights and opportunity for women are per-
vasive. Of special concern is the field of employment. In 1969 there were
30.5 million women workers constituting 38% of all workers.5 Approxi-
mately 17.9 million wives worked outside the home.' Moreover, 5.4
million families were headed by women.' The median income of full-
time working women was substantially below that of men.8 Because
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) [sex provision]. See note 11 infra.
3. Exec. Order No. 11246 (as amended), 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(Supp. V, 1965-69); Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R. 446 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(Supp. V, 1965, 1965-69).
4. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-111.37 (West 1957), MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.301-423.311 (1967). See also IND. ANN. STAT. 0 40-2307--40-2317 (Burns
Supp. 1970), ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 48, § 851-67, 881-87 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
5. WomEx'S BL=Au, DEPT. OF LAoR, BACKGROUND FACTS ON WOmEN WoRxERs
IN UNITED STATES 1 (1970). "Nearly one-half (49%) of all women 18 to 64 years of
age were workers in 1969." Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 2.
7. "Many of these families were poor despite the fact that the women family
heads were in the labor force. Among the 32 million families whose head had some
work experience in 1968, about 772,000 or 24% had incomes below the poverty level." Id.
8. The median earnings of year-around, full-time working women fourteen years
of age and over in 1968 were $4,457. This was only 58% of the $7,664 median earnings
of fully employed male workers. Twenty percent of the women but only eight percent
of the men earned less than $3,000. At the upper end of the scale only 3% of working
women but 28% of the men earned $10,000 or more in 1968. Id. at 4.
Comparison of Median Wages for 1968
Year-around, full-time workers All workers
WY omen Me,; Women Men
Professional, technical,
and kindred workers $6,691 $10,151 $5,564 $9,368
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of the significant societal group involved, the problem of wage disparity
demands a solution.
Federal Legislation
The Equal Pay Act of 1963,9 an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, prohibits employers from paying wages to employees:
at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility... 10
There are provisions for pay differentiation based upon seniority, the
merit system, and quantity of production.
In 1964 another step toward eliminating the barrier to equal oppor-
tunities was the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Directed
toward unlawful employment practices, the Act prohibited employers,
labor unions, and employment agencies from discriminating on the basis
of sex, as well as race, color, religion, or national origin. 1 The Act also
Managers, officials, and
propietors (except farm) 5,635 10,340 4,840 9,904
Clerical and kindred
workers 4,789 7,351 3,882 6,755
Sales workers 3,461 8,549 2,073 7,245
Id. at 20.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963). Congressional Finding and Declaration of Policy:
(a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce of wage differentials
based on sex-
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for
their health and efficiency;
(2) prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor resources;
(3) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening, affecting, and
obstructing commerce;
(4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5) constitutes an unfair method of competition.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act . . . through exercise
by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and




11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Title VIII.
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
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created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2 charged with
the responsibility of administering the Act, and a complex procedural
provision for the prevention of unlawful employment practices.1" The
United States Attorney General is authorized to bring suit when he has
"reasonable cause to believe there is a pattern or practice of resistance
to the full employment of any of the rights secured by this title"'4 or to
intervene in a suit if he feels the case is of "general public importance."' 5
Another provision of particular importance is the bona fide occupational
exception. 6 The Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency
to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against,
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to
classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) It shall be unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 [hereinafter referred to as the EEOC].
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. After a charge has been filed, the Commission furnishes
the respondent with a copy and makes an investigation of such charge. If the Com-
mission determines there is reasonable cause to believe the charge to be true, it
notifies the respondent and seeks to eliminate the unlawful employment practice by
"informal method of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." The Commission has
60 days to secure voluntary compliance; if it is not achieved, it so notifies the parties.
The aggrieved party can then file a complaint within 30 days in a District Court, since
the Commission has no enforcement power of its own. For extensive study of the pro-
cedural requirements see Comment, A Priner to Procedure and Rentedy Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 U. Pirr. L. REv. 407 (1970) ; Rawalt, Litigating
Sex Discrinditation Cases, 4 FAm. L.Q. 44 (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6.
15. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e). However, the Attorney General has brought only one
suit alleging 1sex discrimination, United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 3 CCH-
EPD 8052 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964):
Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex,
or national origin; educational institutions with personnel of particular religion
[hereinafter referred to as a BFOQ].
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any
individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or
refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
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appear to correct inequities in employment and provide remedies for sex-
based discrimination.'7
Cases Under Title VII
The legal disputes involving these statutes have been significant in
number, yet only one case has reached the Supreme Court." Several
lower federal courts have declared various employment practices as in
violation of Title VII. In Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co. 9 female
or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program,
on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a
school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school,
college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is,
in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by
a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or
society, or if the curriculum of each school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propaga-
tion of a particular religion. [Emphasis added.]
Given a narrow interpretation, the exception applies only "in those certain cir-
cumstances" when "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business," which should not include presumptions of women's life patterns, certain
attributes of a 'sex, or the prejudices on the part of customers, the public, or other
employees. The exception is meant to apply in very limited cases such as a woman for
an actress, or a washroom attendant, or a model. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1970).
It should be noted that the BFOQ cannot apply to race because this factor could
never be a reasonable necessity in the normal operation of a business.
17. For extensive analytical treatment of Title VII see Miller, Sex Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. RFv. 877 (1967) ; Rawalt,
supra note 13; Comment, The Mandate of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: To
Treat Women as Individuals, 59 GEo. L.J. 221 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mandate] :
Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REv.
778 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Classification] ; Comment, supra note 13;
Comment, A Woman's Place: Diminishing Justification for Sex Discrimination in
Employment, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 183 (1968).
18. 39 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1971), vacated and remanded. For discus-
sion of the case see text accompanying notes 29-33, 39 infra.
In four years of EEOC operation, 1965-69, complaining parties have filed about
41,000 charges of discrimination, approximately 24,000 of which were assigned for in-
vestigation, and of those investigated 27% (over 6,700) involved allegations of dis-
crimination based on sex. Pressman, The Quiet Revolution, 4 FAm. L.Q. 31, 32 (1970).
However, discrimination still exists: "Over 75% of all working women are confined,
by legal discriminations, union contracts, stereotyped concepts, and lack of opportunity
for training, to the lower-level routine clerical, sales, factory jobs, or as household
workers." Rawalt, supra note 13, at 44, citing WomEN's BUREAU, DEPT. OF LABOR, WB
68-161, Apr. 1968. "The largest major occupation group of employed women in 1969
was clerical workers. Of the nearly 10 million in clerical jobs, 3.4 million were working
as stenographers, typists, and secretaries. The next two largest major occupation groups
were service workers (except private household and operatives-about 4.7 million and
4.5 million respectively)." BACKGROUND FACTS ON WOMEN WoRKRs IN UNITED STATES,
supra note 5, at 3.
19. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g. in part 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
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employees brought suit against their employer and the union. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court dismissal as to the union
because it was not charged with violations before the EEOC. However,
the court found employer violations of Title VII, as the seniority system
permitted men to bid for jobs plant-wide while women were restricted to
jobs which did not require lifting in excess of 35 pounds. The court
stated that 35 pounds could continue as a general guideline for both men
and women; however, each employee must be. afforded an opportunity
to demonstrate his ability to perform more strenuous jobs and those
who could must be allowed to bid on and fill such positions. The weight
restriction was not imposed by statute but rather by the employer and
the union. Thus, the former practice had been pursued under the guise
of protecting women when in reality it limited job openings, job choices,
and pay levels. In three other cases there were state statutes imposing
weight restrictions enforced by the employers which were successfully
challenged by female employees because the restrictions denied them job
opportunities."
In Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone and Telegraph
Co.2 a similar weight lifting restriction was linked to the type of job.
Because of the necessary rural canvassing and the requirement to lift a
case weighing about 60 pounds, the employer refused to hire women as
commercial representatives. Although the evidence presented showed that
males could work more efficiently and more safely, it failed to indicate
that all, or substantially all, women would be unable to perform the
duties. Consequently, the court struck down the restriction as violative
of Title VII and imposed a duty upon the employer "to determine on
an individual basis whether a person is qualified for the position of
commercial representative.
22
20. Weeks v. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), was the first
appellate court decision to follow the EEOC weight restriction guideline, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.1 (1968). For text see notes 49 and 52 infra. The court held that the state law
to be in violation of Title VII. Although the employer claimed such restriction was a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), he failed to sustain the burden of proof
and the court did not allow a presumption in his favor because of the state law. For an
explanation of the case see 4 GA. L. Rrv. 417 (1970).
The same result was reached in Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338(D. Ore. 1969), with the rationale resting on the fact that Title VII has superceded
conflicting state laws by virtue of the supremacy clause.
In California the same question was avoided in Mengelkock v. Industrial Welfare
Comn'n, 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal 1968), 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968), but
answered in Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968). The district
court held that California's hours and weight laws, CAL. LABoR CODE, §§ 1171-1256,
1350-57 (West Supp. 1970), violated the Civil Rights Act; the female plaintiff had been
denied a job as "agent-telegrapher" because she was subject to these laws.
21. 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
22. Id. at 760.
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Title VII, however, is not providing an adequate remedy for all
instances of job discrimination. For example, the federal court in Mengel-
kock v. Industrial Welfare Commission" employed the abstention doc-
trine24 to avoid the issue of an alleged state-federal law conflict. Because
determination of the controversy turned on the validity of the state law,
it was deemed inappropriate for a federal court to be the first to resolve
the dispute. Judge Stephens stated that while the federal statute was clear
on its face, the purpose of the California restrictions was "not by any
means apparent."2 His rationale indicates that if the state had a legiti-
mate health and welfare interest in women's hours and weight lifting
restrictions, the statute would withstand attack. However, one of the
primary goals of Title VII is to supercede legislation which differentiates
female from male as a class unless the burdens of a BFOQ are met.26
An additional problem precluding courts from adjudicating equal
opportunity violations is the complex procedure established by the Civil
Rights Act.27 In Union Bank v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission" the court held that the Commission did not have jurisdiction
over a dispute involving a female employee who alleged a Title VII
violation because she had not first exhausted all available state remedies.
Finally, there is the problem of interpretation of the Act. In Phillips
23. 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968). The abstention doctrine was also invoked
in Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. La. 1968).
24. The doctrine of abstention is most adequately discussed in D. CtURuM, FEDERAL
COURTS 500-29 (1968). This discretionary device forces the litigation to return to the
state courts and is a useful tool iri avoiding a constitutional question.
There appears to be two poles in the application of abstention. One is the state
regulatory scheme where the state courts' expertise and the localism of the problem make
it rational for the federal court to not disturb the state sovereign. The other pole is the
civil rights area which could not be finalized by a single litigation involving only a single
set of circumstances. The cases which illustrate the transition between the regulatory
scheme and the civil rights situation are: Alabama Public Service Conm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) when the regulatory scheme was sufficient to invoke abstention;
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), where abstention
was applied to an eminent domain proceeding to essentially defeat diversity jurisdiction,
but the court retained jurisdiction to protect federal fact finding capabilities; and County
of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), involving another eminent
domain situation. The opinion is similar to the dissenting opinion of Thibodaux, where
abstention was improper because the "state law ... is clear and certain."
It appears that abstention may not be proper in the area of employment oppor-
tunities, especially with the current federal laws and the lack of any special expertise
in the local courts.
25. Mengelkock at 959.
26. See e.g. Weeks discussed in part at note 20 supra, at 232-35.
27. For extensive treatment of the procedural problems see Rawalt, suqpra note 13;
Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Cizil Rights Act of 1964: A Pre-
liminary Study in Federal-State Interagen-cy Relations, 34 Go. WAsH. L. REv. 846
(1966) ; Comment, supra note 13.
28. 408 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1968).
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v. Martin Marietta Corp.-9 the trial court found no violation of Title
VII, where the employer hired men with pre-school age children for a
certain position but refused to hire women with pre-school age children.
On appeal, the employer's primary contention was that he did not rely
on the BFOQ but rather on the premise that his criterion was not dis-
crimination based on sex. Affirming, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that Title VII prohibited only discrimination based on sex and
that in this case it was a "two-pronged" test for disqualification: being
a woman and having pre-school age children. Acceptance of the employer's
non-reliance on a BFOQ consideration was vigorously attacked in the
dissenting opinion. The dissenters reasoned that since the distinguishing
factor in the employer's hiring practice was motherhood versus father-
hood it was sex-related: "It is the fact that the person [is] a mother
-i.e., a woman-not the age of the children, which denies employment
opportunity to a woman which is open to a man." 1
The majority opinion interpreted Title VII to the effect that the
BFOQ provision was inapplicable in analyzing and resolving the com-
plaint because the defendant had failed to rely on it. Rejecting the "two-
pronged" test, the Supreme Court remanded the case, per curiam, to the
district court for a decision on whether the hiring practice qualifies as a
BFOQ."2 Because the Court did not have adequate evidence to decide the
merits of the case, its result was not as determinative as several com-
mentators had hoped.3
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The BFOQ provision84 of Title VII provides a potential loophole
for those employers who wish to continue discriminatory practices. The
permissibility of subtle employment discrimination under the guise of a
BFOQ has received mixed reaction from lower federal courts. In
Weeks,3  the court relied upon the EEOC guideline that "[t]he principle
of non-discrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis
29. 411 F2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 39 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 1971). This case is also significant for it deals with discriminatfon in hiring,
one of the few cases which does. See Pressman, Legal Revolution int Women's Employ-
ment Rights, 44 FLA. B.J. 332, 333 (1970), for discussion of the significance of the case,
especially as it relates to the EEOC.
30. 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th. Cir. 1969).
31. Id. "A mother is still a woman. And if she is denied work outright because she.
is a mother, it is because she is a woman. Congress said that could no longer be done."
Id. at 1262.
32. 39 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1971).
33. E.G., Pressman, supra note 29, at 333; see Mandate, supra note 17, at 235-39.
34. See Mandate, supra note 17, at 224-27.
35. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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of individual characteristics and not on the basis of any characteristic
generally attributed to the group." Consequently, the court ruled that
the defendant employer had failed to sustain his burden of proof in
establishing the switchman job as a BFOQ because:
they [defendant] introduced no evidence concerning the lifting
abilities of women. Rather, they would have us "assume," on
the basis of a "stereotyped characterization" that few or no
women can safely lift 30 pounds, while all men are treated as if
they can . . . [T]echnique is as important as strength in deter-
mining lifting ability. Technique is hardly a function of sex.
What does seem clear is that using these class stereotypes denies
positions to a great many women perfectly capable of perform-
ing duties involved."7
Courts have indicated that sex would be a BFOQ for a job only
where the employer proved that all or substantially all members of one
sex are unable to perform it. 8 For example, the Supreme Court decided
in Phillips that the "unlawful employment practice" provision does not
permit one hiring policy for women and another for men, each having
pre-school age children; the consideration on remand is whether the
"existence of such conflicting family obligations" is the basis of a
BFOQ.89
Cases which have permitted BFOQ exceptions were decided, for the
most part, prior to the 1969 amendments of the EEOC guidelines.
Today, the Gudbrandson4 decision should not be followed. A complaint
seeking to compel the employer to hire women as "warehousemen" was
denied because the court found the exclusion to be a valid BFOQ.
While concluding that the employer could exclude women on the basis of
a 40 pound weight lifting limit established by the employer, the court did
acknowledge that some women could do the work without harm. How-
ever, it was stated that the process of selection would involve a high
degree of risk and danger. This decision conflicts with the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal's opinion in Weeks.
One of the earliest group of litigants to challenge the validity of
BFOQ's were airline stewardesses who questioned the employer tradition
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1) (ii) (1969). This same burden was imposed and not
met in Cheatwood involving the same defendant employer. See text accompanying note
21 supra.
37. 408 F.2d at 235-36.
38. Pressman, supra note 29, at 332. Pressman is the senior attorney for the office
of the General Counsel of the EEOC.
39. 39 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1971).
40. 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968).
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of requiring "single" status. The court in Cooper v. Delta Airlines41
permitted the airline to discharge a stewardess who was married, because
the regulation was regarded as a BFOQ. Since a BFOQ is allowed only
when sex classification is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business or enterprise,42 does the inability of a married
woman to obtain a job as an airline stewardess rest on the rationale that
the married stewardess must be away from her husband on a regular
basis, or because the married stewardess is no longer a dating fantasy
for the male customers.
In Lansdale v. United Air Lines, Inc.4 the employer relied upon
the Phillips "two-pronged" tests, rather than the BFOQ to discharge a
female employee, not because she was female but because she was female
and married. The court conclude that Title VII did not prohibit dis-
crimination in employment based upon marital status. This distinction is
unwarranted since the no-marriage condition for employment was not
applicable to anyone other than stewardesses, indicating that sex, rather
than marital status, was the controlling factor. Moreover, the EEOC
guidelines state that an employer who forbids or restricts the employment
of married women but does not do likewise for married men is discrim-
inating on the basis of sex." In 1970, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.," found
practices similar to those in Lansdale violative of Title VII.
State Laws
State protective laws were passed during the first part of the
twentieth century when labor conditions were generally deplorable.4"
Those covering women only were generally held constitutional, whereas
those covering both men and women were deemed unconstitutional."
41. 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(e).
43. 62 CCH Lab. Cas.; ff 9416-17 (S.D. Fla. 1969), appeal docketed, No. 29254,
5th Cir., Feb. 16, 1970.
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1970). This provision was also in effect under the old
guidelines, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1966-69). Compare Lamsdale with Colvin v. Pied-
mont Aviation, Inc., E.E.O.C. Dec., Case No. 6-8-6975, June 20, 1968.
45. 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. IIl. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 18481, 7th Cir., May
15, 1970; and Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., E.E.O.C. Dec., Case No. 6-6-5759, June
20, 1968.
46. See Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29
HAIW. L. REv. 353 (1916); Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21
HARe. L. Rv. 495 (1908).
47. See text accompanying note 76 infra. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45(1905),
holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting employment in a bakery for more
than 60 hours in one week or 10 hours in one day because it interfered with employer-
employee freedom of contract applicable to the states as part of "liberty" in the four-
teenth amendment; contra, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), sustaining a state-
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However, with the passage of Title VII the question of the effect of the
former on equal opportunity, as well as the necessity to "protect" only
one class of laborers, has now come into prominence. In the EEOC's
1966 guidelines4 8 two classifications for state protection laws were
established : It would be an unlawful employment practice not to, e.g.,
hire and promote, because the state law required certain benefits, i.e.,
minimum wage, rest periods, to be extended to women ;" it would not,
however, be an unlawful employment practice to refuse to, e.g., hire and
promote if state statutes prohibited types of employment, i.e., lifting heavy
weights, working more than certain hours each day or number of days
per week.5' Thus, the guidelines apparently upheld the validity of both
types of state laws. In 1969, the Commission changed its position with
respect to state laws prohibiting several types of employment for women.
The new guidelines narrowed the exemption and provided that state
protective laws would no longer "be considered a defense to an otherwise
established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the application
of the BFOQ exemption."52
imposed eight hour day for employees of underground mines. Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U.S. 426 (1917), ,sustaining regulation of hours for men in manufacturing, overruled
Lochner.
See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), holding unconstitutional the
regulation of wages for women as violative of due process which was overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1940), sustained the constitutionality of the federal minimum wage law.
48. The guidelines are promulgated under the authority of 42 U.S.C. -t 2000e-12(a):
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue, amend,
or rescind suitable procdural regulations to carry out the provisions of this
title. Regulations issued under this section shall be in conformity with the
standards and limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1966).
The Commission believes that some state laws and regulations with
respect to the employment of women, although originally promulgated for valid
protective reasons, have ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expand-
panding role of the woman worker in our economy. We shall continue to study
the problems posed by these laws and regulations in particular factual contexts,
and to cooperate with other appropriate agencies in achieving a regulatory
system more responsive to the demands of equal opportunity in employment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1966).
The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to disturb such
laws and regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting
women against exploitation and hazard . . . . However, in cases where the
clear effect of a law in current circumstances is not to protect women but to
subject them to discrimination, the law will not be considered a justification
for discrimination. 29 C.F.R. 1604.1 (c) (1966).
50. Id. § 1604.1(a) (3) (i).
51. Id. § 1604.1(a) (3) (ii).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1)-(2) (1970)
(b) (1) Many states have enacted laws or promulgated administrative
regulations with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws are
those which prohibit or limit the employment of females in certain occupations
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The state protective laws"5 presently under scrutiny are of several
types. One such type is the weight lifting limitations imposed only upon
women; Utah prohibits carrying more than 15 pounds or lifting more
than thirty,"' while California permits lifting of up to 50 pounds but
restricts amounts carried on stairways to 10 pounds.5 California's stair-
way limitation appears irrational in light of every mother who must
carry a baby around the house, often up and down stairs. Another
restriction is the "no work" statute which prohibits the employment of
women in particular industries. Indiana is typical in that it prohibits
women working in mines."8 A third example is the limitation on the
maximum hours each day or per week that women may work. California
is not unusual in limiting the amount to eight hours each day, forty-eight
hours per week." The fourth type of protective law is minimum wage
legislation. Indiana's statute"8 applies to both men and women as do the
laws in several other states. California's statute,5 9 however, applies only
to women. Other types of "protective laws" require rest periods,"5 seats
for women,"' and provisions for physical facilities.6"
in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying of weights, excluding certain prescribed
limits, during certain hours of the night, or for more than a specified number
of hours per day or per week.
(b) (2) The Commission believes that such state laws and regulations,
although originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have
ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the female
worker in our economy.... Such laws do not take into account the capacities,
preferences, and abilities of individual females and tend to discriminate rather
than protect. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that such laws and
regulations conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will
not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment
practice or as a basis for the application of the BFOQ exception.
One case reflecting the new guidelines is Lansdale, supra notes 43, 44.
53. For a comprehensive study written before the 1969 amendment to the guidelines
of the relationship between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state protective laws see
Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DEN. LJ. 344 (1967).
The author's thesis is "any state statute which, on its face, retains an underlying protec-
tive policy pertinent to the modern labor force, would be within the state's police power
to enact, and would not be pre-empted by Title VII." Id. at 371, 375.
54. 2 CCH LAE. L. REP. STATE LAWS 45,525 (1969). (See same paragraph
under each state for other states' laws, i.e., Alaska, Ohio, Oregon.)
55. CAL. LABOR CODE, §§ 1251-52 (West 1955).
56. IND. ANN. STAT. § 46-2704 (Bums Repl. 1956). Also, Michigan had a ruling in
its liquor licensing statute which prohibited women from working as bartenders in the
absence of a husband or father as the owner, MIcH. CouP. LAWs ANN. § 436.19a
(repealed 1955).
57. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350 (West 1955); 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. STATE LAWS
(Utah) 44,501 (1969).
58. Im. ANN. STAT. § 40-135 (Burns Repl. 1970).
59. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1171, 1182 (West 1955).
60. E.g., Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969). The
rest period provision was in the union contract.
61. E.g., Iz. ANN. STAT. § 40-1006 (Burns Repl. 1965).
62. Id.
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Whether the dissimilar treatment of employees on the basis of sex
violates Title VII becomes the crucial issue. Those who favor protective
state laws maintain that Congress intended to proscribe only those laws
which deny equal opportunity to women. Opponents claim that protective
legislation is inherently discriminatory."3 The EEOC guidelines indicate
that these state laws conflict with Title VII. However, protective legisla-
tion persists, denying women equal opportunities.64
Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment can also
be used to support or attack employment equality. One authority in this
field, Leo Kanowitz,65 suggests an "extension" doctrine as a means to
achieve equal opportunity for women.6
Kanowitz separates the types of protective laws in a fashion similar
63. WOMEN'S BUREAU, DEPT. OF LABOR, LAWS ON SEX DIScRIMINATION IN EiPLoY-
MENT 10 (1970).
64. Because of these extremes, it is fruitful to investigate the various states
attorneys general interpretation of the problem and practical application of the laws.
Prior to the August 1969 guidelines, the attorneys general from South Dakota,
North Dakota, and Kentucky issued opinions. On February 27, 1969, the attorney general
from South Dakota said the hours statute yielded to Title VII; on April 18, 1969, the
attorney general from North Dakota stated recent developments might prevent pro-
secution for violation of state clauses regulating employment of women; but Kentucky's
attorney general ruled the state hours law would remain in effect until the Supreme
Court ruled otherwise. Id.
Subsequent to these August guidelines other states issued policy statements. Ohio's
Department of Industrial Relations announced on September 4, 1969, that it would not
prosecute violations of state protective labor legislation in conflict with the revised
guidelines. Oklahoma's attorney general stated that because of the supremacy clause the
state's hour law would yield to Title VII. Michigan's and Pennsylvania's attorneys
general, on December 30, 1969, and November 4, 1969, respectively, stated that Title VII
would control. In North Carolina, however, the Commissioner of the Department of
Labor stated on November 25, 1969, that until a federal court held otherwise the Com-
missioner would continue to enforce the state hours law. Id. at 10-11.
65. Professor Kanowitz has compiled several law journal articles in this area into
a book, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANOWTZ, WOMEN]. In
a recent article he responded to various criticisms of his methodology and assumptions,
Kanowitz, Wonan and the Law: A Reply to Some Commentators, 4 FAir. L.Q. 19(1970) [hereinafter cited as Kanowitz, Reply]. In this article he states several
premises of his book in order to show his underlying philosophy:
One [reason for the book] was the rather widespread assumption among
members of the American community and public that the problem of sex-based
inequality in legal norms no longer existed. Another was the clear need to
explode that myth if meaningful reform was to occur in this area. And finally,
there was my own perception of the law-society relationship in this field. Id. at
19.
. . . throughout the book there is an implicit assumption that sex-based
unevenness of treatment under law is as destructive of human personality and
happiness as the United States Supreme Court found to be true in the area of
race relations as a result of the previous doctrine "separate but equal." Id. at 21.
66. KANOWITZ, WOMEN at 117-31, 182-92.
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to the classification used by the old EEOC guidelines, 7 namely those
which provide benefits and those which prevent "hazardous" work. The
former should be "extended" to men if the true purpose of the state
legislation is a valid interest in the protection of workers. By construing
the statute as conferring the same benefits upon men, it would be applied
equally as required by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Hence, courts could avoid the undesirability of declaring a statute
unconstitutional, yet administer equal protection under the law."8 Extend-
ing the benefits of protective legislation is a logical method to test the
real purpose of the law. If the statute does in fact provide a benefit, male
employees should also enjoy it. If the protection is unwanted, unnecessary,
or too restrictive, men would reject it just as women have attempted to
do.8
9
In the category of hazardous work, the statutes typically prohibit
women from lifting or carrying items of a certain weight or deny women
the opportunity to work in certain industries. Under the logic of the
extension doctrine, to the effect that a state statute is constitutional only
if men and women receive the same treatment, the theoretical result is
that the state statute under consideration would be held constitutional by
reading into it an equal status for men. Therefore, the stoppage of large
segments of industry would ensue since no one would lift the required
weight or work in any restricted occupation. Consequently, Kanowitz
would not apply the extension doctrine to state statutes prohibiting
hazardous work. Rather, he suggests that under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments these statutes should be held invalid by rejecting the "any
rational basis" test, used historically to uphold these state statutes as a
legitimate exercise of the police power, and instead regard the subject
matter as a fundamental, basic right.7"
Once the subject matter is characterized as a fundamental right, then
67. See note 49 supra.
68. Several Supreme Court cases have extended a benefit in order to find statutes
constitutional, especially in the area of basic human rights; see e.g., Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy the Court held that five illegitimate children could bring an
action for wrongful death of their mother, although the state court traditionally had
held that the statute applied only to legitimate children. The equal protection clause
was violated by denying the right to a cause of action; illegitimate children are not
"non persons"; they are human and alive, thus entitled to equal protection under the law.
Id. at 70.
69. See Classification, supra note 17. "Legislation that irrationally confers a
'benefit' on one sex is by definition a detriment to the other sex and represents the clearest
case of equal protection violation." Id. at 784.
70. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), found the freedom to marry to be a
"basic right," "fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. at 12. The Court
stated that to deny fundamental freedom on unsupported information violated both the
equal protection and the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
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in order to sustain the validity of a statute which categorically prohibits
women from certain employment, "the state will be required to sustain a
much greater burden of justification to support the classification.""
Since this burden will rarely be fulfilled, the practical result is to declare
that laws may no longer bar women from a certain occupation or duty,
rather they must permit individuals, men or women, to establish their
ability or inability of performance. A presumption that women should be
excluded might be permissible as long as individuals could rebut the
presumption with a showing of ability.
In the area of "hazardous work" legislation, where the "extension
theory" is inappropriate,72 some basis is needed to determine who should
or should not perform the given task. Authors Murray and Eastwood"
recognize a socio-legal interest in the protection of women's maternal
and familial functions. For this reason they recommend that laws should
be classified according to function which, if performed, would not be
based upon sex. With this functional analysis, the intrinsic value of
the homemaker or mother is recognized,74 and workers are not restricted
to certain jobs because of a mere label.
Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause
Although commentators suggest modes of analysis for the applica-
tion of the equal protection clause to alleged sex discrimination practices,
the judiciary continues to follow the precedent of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The cases illustrate the facility with which
the courts have found classification based on sex to be rational, often
neglecting the principle that the classification must be rational for the
purpose of the particular statute.75 For example, the 1907 decision of
Muller v. Oregon" has been followed as recently as 1968." In Muller
the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon state law restricting the maximum
hours a woman could work each day and per week, although it had only
recently declared a similar statute which applied to men as uncon-
stitutional.78 While the decision to protect workers, if only one group of
71. KANOWITZ, WOMEN at 157-58.
72. For critical examination of Kanowitz' approach see Indritz, Commentary, 4
FAm. L.Q. 6 (1970) ; Pressman, supra note 29; Rawalt, supra note 13: and for a response
see Kanowitz, Reply.
73. Murray and Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232,
239 (1965), cited with approval in KANOWITZ, WOMEN at 155-57.
74. Murray and Eastwood, supra note 73, at 241.
75. See Classification, supra note 17, at 784.
76. 208 U.S. 412 (1907).
77. Mengelkock v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 950, 954-55 (C.D. Cal.
1968).
78. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), held state law restricting hours not
EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
them, may have been a reasonable response to the sweat shop employment
conditions of the time, the premise that sex serves as a rational basis for
classification continues to haunt decisions today 9 when the need for the
distinction is no longer warranted."0
In cases subsequent to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
female plaintiffs have alleged violation of the Act itself as well as the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The response of the
courts, in employment cases brought under the Constitution, has been to
either abstain in order that the state may decide or to dismiss any three-
judge panel, for lack of substantiality of a constitutional issue."' In areas
other than employment involving fourteenth amendment actions, judicial
developments are uneven. On the one hand, laws have been invalidated
which exclude women from jury duty and which impose longer prison
terms on women than men for the same crime.8 2 On the other hand, there
have been judicial rulings upholding laws which permit the statute of
limitations in negligence actions to expire earlier for a woman than for
a man"s and which deny a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium
for negligent injury to her husband. 4
Another area of divergent judicial decisions involves state-supported
schools. In Texas the state university system is composed of sixteen
coeducational schools, one male school and one female school. Allred v.
Heatoi s5 involved an action against the Board of Trustees which had
refused the female plaintiff admission to Texas A & M, the male school.
a legitimate exercise of the police power as to men; it was unreasonable, unnecessary, and
arbitrary. See note 47 supra.
79. See cases set forth in notes 83, 84 infra; Mengelkock v. Industrial Welfare
Comm'n, supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
80. For cases expressing a similar philosophy as Muller, see Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948) ; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) ; Miller v. Wilson, 236
U.S. 373 (1915) ; Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) ; Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. 130 (Wall. 1872).
81. Coon v. Tingle, 277 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1967) ; Mengelkock v. Industrial
Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1968) ; Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162
(E.D. La. 1968) ; See note 24 supra for a discussion of the abstention doctrine.
82. Indritz, supra note 72, at 11; see also, Murray and Eastwood, stupra note 73, at
241; Comment, Constitutional Law: Exclusion of Wonen From Jury Does Not Deny
Equal Protection, 51 MiN. L. REv. 552 (1967).
83. Jacobson v. Lenhart, 30 Ill.2d 225, 195 N.E.2d 638 (1964).
84. Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1066 (1969). See also Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968)
permitting computation of pension benefits under the Social Security Act which dis-
criminates against men having age and earnings credits equal to that of a woman.
85. 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960); accord,
Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1958).
For discussion and criticism of the cases' rationale see Comment, Sex Discrimination it
College Admissions: The Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity, 56 IowA L. REv.
209, 220-21 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Quest].
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The court held that this refusal did not violate the plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights although she wanted to study floraculture, which was
offered at no other school in Texas. A three-judge panel in Virginia
reached the opposite result in Kirstein v. University of Virginia.s" The
court stated that these female plaintiffs had a constitutional right to an
education equal with that offered men at Charlottesville; thus, the dis-
crimination on the basis of sex violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.8
7
The Equal Rights Amendment
The foregoing analysis reveals that although Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment provide the means by which to end discrimination against women,
they have not been so utilized. Failure lies not in some inherent defect,
but rather it is the lack of a concerted national policy advocating equal
rights for women. Hence, the consideration of equal opportunity turns
to an analysis of the Equal Rights Amendment and its possible effective-
ness if enacted. The Amendment states:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.8
An examination of the debates in Congress 9 reveals the many
misconceived notions and misunderstanding as to the objectives sought to
86. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). For examination and criticism of the case
see Quest, supra note 85.
87. 309 F. Supp. at 187. The court found that the other state schools, some only for
women, others only for men, did not offer equal facilities with respect to these plaintiffs.
The case was dismissed as moot, for a district court judge had issued a preliminary
order to the University of Virginia to consider without regard to sex plaintiffs' applica-
tion for admission. However, the court provided that upon motion and for good cause
shown the action could be reinstated within one year, because the university had imple-
mented a three stage plan by which in 1972 women would be admitted on precisely the
same basis as men.
Compare Murray and Eastwood, supra note 73, at 240 and 2 B. SCHWARTZ, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 3 § 475 (Rights of the
Person) at 535 (1968) (who states that there is no inference of discrimination when
"separate but equal" education opportunities for sexes exist) with Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Quest, supra note 85, at 217 that "separate but
equal" is inherently unequal.
88. H.R.J. Res. 264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
89. These debates occurred in the second session of the 91st Congress, lasting one
day in the House but unfinished in the Senate.
The House first had to discharge the Amendment out of committee where it had
been for 22 years without a hearing. Introduced into Congress for 47 consecutive years,
the Amendment has been endorsed by both political party conventions for 26 years. 116
CONG. R c. 7948 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
The Amendment, as Senate Joint Resolution 9, has been introduced in the 92d
Congress. See 117 CONG. Rxc. 141-44 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1971).
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be promoted. In the House, the advocates expressed the general senti-
ment that approval of the Amendment was imperative in light of the fact
that women are not accorded equal treatment.9" The House sponsor,
Martha Griffiths (D-Mich.), who favored passage noted that although
the fifth and fourteenth amendments could be authority for ending sex
discrimination, the Court has failed to so find.9 Opponents, however,
feared passage would cause the downgrading of women.9" Representative
McCullough (R-Ohio), an opponent, stated there was a need to have
factual evidence to show that discrimination based on sex in fact existed.9"
Another opponent, Representative Celler (D-N.Y.), was against the
Amendment because no one knew the consequences it would have." In
summary, proponents attempted to distinguish between those sex char-
acteristcs which should continue to be recognized and those which should
not, whereas opponents ignored any effort to classify characteristics in
voicing their opposition.95
Most of the Senate debate was directed toward proposed riders and
collateral matters.9" However, Senator Eagleton (D-Mo.) expressed
concern as to whether the right of privacy would continue to be viable so
as to insure that various facilities, such as restrooms, remained separate.97
If the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Constitution are sufficient
tools with which to eliminate discrimination against women but have
failed thus far because of judicial reluctance to utilize them, one may
well ask what is the utility of passing the Equal Rights Amendment.
Since it has been iterated that judicial inaction may be. the result of a lack
of national policy in the area of women's rights, the debates and passage
90. 116 CONG. REc. at 7952, 7963-70 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
91. Id. at 7948.
92. Id. at 7971.
93. Id. at 7948.
94. Id. at 7949.
95. Id. at 7952, 7963. The House passed the Amendment 350 to 15. Id. at 7984-85.
It went to the Senate, not to committee, and was placed on the calendar for consideration
by the entire body.
96. On Oct. 9, 1970, Senator Allen (D-Ala.) proposed his "busing amendment"
which was defeated 17 to 57, 116 CONG. REc. 17758 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970). On Oct. 12,
1970, Senator Ervin (D-N.C.) proposed his amendment to exempt women from com-
pulsory military service which was passed 36 to 33, 116 CONG. REc. 17895 (daily ed. Oct.
13, 1970). Also on Oct. 13, 1970, Senator Baker (R-Tenn.) proposed his prayer amend-
ment to overrule the Supreme Court cases against prayer in schools which was passed
50 to 20, 116 CONG. REc. 17923 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970). On Oct. 14, 1970, Senator Bayh
(D-Ind.) proposed a different equal rights amendment in an attempt to reconcile the
different forces and compromise with the opponents, 116 CONG. REc. 18076 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1970).
97. 116 CoNG. REc. 17631, 17638 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970). Sen. Bayh responded that




may serve to "help educate the American public about may aspects of sex
discrimination and the need to eliminate them."98
If the Amendment is enacted and if courts are willing to give it full
force and effect, then the implications are several. One consequence of
the Equal Rights Amendment would be the alteration in domestic relation
principles. For example, the husband's common law duty of support
could evolve into each spouse's duty of contribution; thus, failure to
support would no longer be an effective ground for divorce. Instead,
the ground for divorce would be failure to contribute to a reasonable
extent. 9 Another change would be the husband's automatic role as
"head of the household," with its corresponding privileges and obligations
such as the right to determine domicile.10 State laws which presently
prohibit the granting of alimony to ex-husbands would become vulner-
able to constitutional attack.' Since the area of domestic relations is in
itself complex and has some unique considerations, these changes are only
illustrative of the Amendment's probable effect.'0 2
Another implication of passing the House version of the Amend-
ment is the subjection of women to the draft.' Several Congressmen
believe that this would lead to the abolition of the draft altogether
because of the adverse public opinion likely to ensue if women are
drafted.' Others believe that women are psychologically and physio-
logically unfit to endure military hardships."0 5 If one accepts the premise of
the Amendment that distinctions will be based on factors other than
sex, then logical consistency requires that women should indeed be sub-
ject to the draft.
The Amendment would also effect the validity of present state
protective laws. 6 Those that categorically bar women from certain types
98. Indritz, supra note 72, at 12.
99. 116 CONG. REc. 7962 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
100. Id,
101. See generally Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 880 (1959).
102. For treatment in detail of the changes in domestic relations see "Selected
State Laws Relating to Domestic Relations," prepared by American Law Division,
Library of Congress, cited in 116 CONG. REc. 7949-52 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970) ; Gorecki,
Wow en and the Low: From a Different Viewpoint, 4 FAM. L.Q. 13 (1970) ; Lay, Role of
Matrimonial Domicile in Marital Property Rights, 4 FAm. L.Q. 61 (1970); Murray and
Eastwood, supra note 73, at 240-41.
103. But see 116 CONG. REc. 17792 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970). The problem would
be solved by passage of the Senate version, see note 96 mspra.
104. E.g., 116 CONG. REc. 7953 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
105. 116 CONG. REc. 17781 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970).
106. A list of state protective laws for women is found in WOMEN'S BUREAU,
DEPT. OF LABOR, STATE PROTECTIVE LAWS (1969) cited in 116 CONG. R c. 7955-59 (daily
ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
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of employment would be unconstitutional." 7 In answer to the charge that
the Amendment will take away the benefits now afforded women, the
"extension" approach for its application is advocated." 8 As one Congress-
women stated:
Some state laws-those which deny rights or restrict freedoms
of one sex-would be violative of the equal rights amendment
and rendered unconstitutional. Laws which confer benefits and
privileges on one sex would have to apply to both sexes
equally, but would not be rendered unconstitutional by this
amendment.'
Conclusion
It is submitted that the present discrimination against women must
end. To judicially accomplish this goal within the present constitutional
framework is feasible. Yet the educational process, in terms of establish-
ing a national policy, implicit in passing the Equal Rights Amendment
is important. Although equal rights for women would mean the loss of
some of the special treatment they are now accorded, this should be
deemed insignificant in a society whose basic premises are individual
freedom and equality.
JULIA C. LAMBER
107. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
108. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
109. 116 CONG. REc. 7968 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970) (Remarks by Rep. May (R-
Wash.). For examination of these and other areas of change effected by the Amendment
see KANowITz, WomEN at 160-78; Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern
Trends in the Law Concerning Womnen's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 262 (1970).
